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CAN THE RICH FEND FOR
THEMSELVES?:
INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF
WEALTHY INVESTORS UNDER THE
PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS REGISTRATION ACT OF 2010
Vijay Sekhon *

I. INTRODUCTION
The federal securities laws are littered with exemptions for wealthy
investors.' The rationale underlying these exemptions is that wealthy
investors can "fend for themselves" because they either possess sufficient
financial sophistication to make informed investment decisions or can
acquire the services of advisers who possess such sophistication.2
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (more commonly
referred to as the "Dodd-Frank Act") into law to "promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system. . . [and] protect consumers from abusive financial

* Senior Counsel in the Office of the General Counsel of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, former associate at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Juris Doctorate from Stanford Law
School and member of the State Bars of California and New York. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by
any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. The
author would like to dedicate this article to his parents.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See, e.g., Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions From the Securities Act of 1933 for
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg.
41,791, 41,802 (Aug. 18, 1981); Resale of Restricted Securities: Changes to Method of Determining
Holding Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6806, 53
Fed. Reg. 44,016, 44,027-28 (Nov. 1, 1988); C. Edward Fletcher, Ill, Sophisticated Investors Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1123 (1988); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS,

87 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.

sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
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services practices." 3 The Dodd-Frank Act includes the Private Fund
Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (the "Private Fund
Registration Act"), which becomes effective on July 21, 2011, and
generally requires advisers to "private funds" with over $150 million in
assets under management to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission and be subject to registration, reporting, recordkeeping, and
examination requirements.' As defined in the Private Fund Registration
Act, "private funds" generally include private equity and hedge funds
limited to wealthy investors, but not venture capital funds.
This comment analyzes the inconsistent treatment of wealthy investors
under the federal securities laws in light of the passage of the Private Fund
Registration Act. Part II summarizes the exemptions in the federal
securities laws for wealthy investors. Part III provides an overview of
private equity and hedge funds, including their investment strategies, size,
and structure. Part IV summarizes the regulation of private funds under the
Private Fund Registration Act. Part V analyzes the regulation of private
funds under the Private Fund Registration Act in light of the exemptions in
the federal securities laws for wealthy investors. This comment concludes
with policy recommendations to eliminate the inconsistent treatment of
wealthy investors under the federal securities laws.
II. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW EXEMPTIONS
FOR WEALTHY INVESTORS
Exemptions for wealthy investors are scattered throughout the federal
securities laws. Under the Securities Act of 1933, the issuance of securities
to public investors generally requires the filing of a registration statement
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and delivery of a
prospectus containing detailed information about the issuer.6 Pursuant to
Rule 506 promulgated by the Commission under the Securities Act, the
issuance of securities to "accredited investors" is generally not considered a
"public offering" and is therefore exempt from the registration and
prospectus delivery requirements in the Securities Act.'
"Accredited
investors" are defined in Rule 501 of the Securities Act to include specified
3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 Preamble (2010).
4. Id. at Title IV.
5. Id. at §§ 402, 407; DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 64 (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.

davispolk.com/files/Publication/efb94428-991 1-4472-b5dd- 006e9c6185bb/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/efd835f6-2014-4a48-832d-O0aa2a4e3fdd/070910 Financial Reform
Summary.pdf KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, TIME FOR MANY PRiVATF FtND MANAGERS TO PREPARE FOR
INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION 1 (July 21, 2010), availableat http://www.kirkland.com/site

Files/Publications/628D32C2C3EA7D6857B9B4F29134390D.pdf;
6. I15
U.S.C. §§77e-g, 77j, 77aa (2009).
7. 17 C.F.R. §230.506(2010).

see also in/ta Part 111.
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institutional investors and individuals with a net worth of over $1 million
or annual income of over $200,000.8 Pursuant to Rule 144A promulgated
by the Commission under the Securities Act, resales of securities to
"qualified institutional buyers" are also exempt from the registration and
"Qualified
prospectus delivery requirements in the Securities Act.'
institutional buyers" are defined in Rule 144A to include specified
institutional investors that own and invest at least $100 million on a
discretionary basis in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the
entity. 'o

Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, issuers that hold
themselves out as being primarily engaged in the business of investing,
reinvesting, or trading in securities are required to register with the
Commission and be subject to investment restrictions and reporting,
organizational, recordkeeping, and examination requirements." Pursuant
to Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act, issuers whose
outstanding securities are owned by no more than 100 persons and which
are not making and do not propose to make a "public offering" of their
securities (i.e., their securities are only issued to "accredited investors") are
exempt from the requirements in the Investment Company Act.' 2 Pursuant
to Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, issuers whose
outstanding securities are owned by "qualified purchasers" and which are
not making and do not propose to make a "public offering" of their
securities are also exempt from the requirements in the Investment
Company Act." "Qualified purchasers" are defined in Section 2(a)(5 1) of
the Investment Company Act to include individuals that own at least $5
million in investments and institutional investors that own and invest at
least $25 million on a discretionary basis.' 4
Finally, Section 205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
prohibits investment advisers from entering into investment advisory
contracts with clients that provide for compensation to the investment
adviser based upon the capital gains or appreciation of the client's funds.' 5
However, Section 205(b)(4) of the Investment Advisers Act permits
investment advisers to enter into investment advisory contracts that provide
for compensation to the investment adviser based upon the capital gains or
appreciation of client funds with issuers exempt from the Investment
Company Act pursuant to Section 3(c)(7) (i.e., issuers whose outstanding

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2010).
17 C.F.R. §230.144A (2010).
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et. seq (2009).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2009).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2009).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (2009).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2009).
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securities are owned by "qualified purchasers").16 Furthermore, Rule 2053(a) promulgated by the Commission under the Investment Advisers Act,
permits investment advisers to enter into investment advisory contracts
with "qualified clients" that provide for compensation to the investment
adviser based upon the capital gains or appreciation of client funds.' 7
"Qualified clients" are defined in Rule 205-3(d) promulgated by the
Commission under the Investment Advisers Act to include individuals or
institutional investors that have at least $750,000 in assets under the
management of the investment adviser, a net worth of more than $1.5
million, or are "qualified purchasers" as defined in the Investment
Company Act.'8
III. PRIVATE EQUITY AND HEDGE FUNDS
Private equity funds generally acquire companies using leverage (i.e.,
debt) for the purpose of restructuring the companies (through acquisitions,
divestitures, elimination of unprofitable business segments, and alignment
of management incentives with those of the private equity funds through
profit participation) for their eventual sale or public offering of securities.1
On the other hand, hedge funds generally implement a wide array of
investment strategies (including long or short positions in equity securities,
arbitrage, and event-driven investments) to produce risk-adjusted positive
returns from various market opportunities. 2 0
According to the research firm Prequin Ltd., 96 private equity funds
raised approximately $107 billion in 2009 (compared with 220 private
equity funds raising approximately $248 billion in 2008 and 228 private
equity funds raising approximately $246 billion in 2007), and private
equity funds acquired 1,050 companies for an aggregate value of
approximately $82 billion in 2009 (compared with 1,521 companies for
approximately $186 billion in 2008 and 2,556 companies for approximately
$659 billion in 2007).21 According to the research firm International
15 U.S.C. §80b-5(b)(4) (2009).
17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2010).
17 C.F.R. §275.205-3(d) (2010).
See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 172, 183-84
(2008); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests Are CreatedEqual, 29 N.W. J. INT'L L. & BuJs.
16.
17.
18.
19.

713, 717 (2009); HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE
(Gerald T. Lins et. al. eds., 2009); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 2, at 7.

§

12:1

20. See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 19, at 191-92, 198-200; Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge
Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L. J. 323, 366 (2007); HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE
FUNDS, supra note 19, at § 1:2; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 2, at viii, 3-4, 33-34.
21 PREQUJIN I TD., THE 2010 PREQIUFIN PRIVATE EQUITY BUYOUT REVIEW 1 (2010), available at
http://www.preqin.com/item/201 0-preqin-buyout-review/0/2774; see also Camille Ricketts, Private
Equity Fund-Raising Hit A Five-Year Bottom in 2009, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.
nyti mes .com/external/venturebeat/20 10/01 /07/O7venturebeat-pri vate-equity-fund-raising-hit- a-fiveyear-76029.html; Deborah (ust & Henry Gibbon, Review of/the Half Year, ACQUISITIONS MONTHLY,
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Financial Services, London, approximately 10,000 hedge funds had $1.5
trillion in assets under management in 2008 (compared with approximately
11,000 hedge funds with $2.1 trillion in assets under management in 2007
and approximately 10,000 hedge funds with $1.8 trillion in assets under
management in 2006).22 Hedge funds also account for between twenty
percent and fifty percent of the trading volume in equities and almost
twenty percent of the trading volume in fixed-income securities. 23
Private equity and hedge funds have historically been structured to
avoid regulation under the federal securities laws, 24 and are generally
structured as limited partnerships with the financial sponsor as the general
partner and investors as the limited partners. 25 Investment in private equity
and hedge funds is generally limited to fewer than 499 "qualified
purchasers" or fewer than 100 "accredited investors" in order to avoid the
registration and prospectus delivery requirements under the Securities Act;
the registration and reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934;26 and the investment restrictions and registration, reporting,
organizational, recordkeeping, and examination requirements under the
Investment Company Act. 27 Furthermore, investment in private equity and
hedge funds is generally limited to "qualified purchasers" or "qualified
clients" to permit fund advisers (which are generally affiliates of the firm
organizing the fund) to enter into performance fee arrangements pursuant
July 2010, at 6, available at http://www.aqm-e.com/pdfs/AM/Q2_200.pdf, Private equity and hedge
funds have generally not been required to publicly disclose their existence, capital raised, or assets
under management. Therefore, the figures for these measures in this comment are estimates based upon
publicly available information and voluntary disclosure made to private database services.
22. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, LONDON, HEDGE FUNDS 2009 1 (April 2009), available
at http://www.thehedgefundjoumal.com/research/ifsl/cbs-hedge-funds-2009-2-.pdf; see also Hedge
Fund Industry - Assets Under Management, BARCLAYHEDGE LTD., http://www.barclayhedge.com/
research/indices/ghs/mum/HFMoneyUnderManagement.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2010); NORA
JORDAN, YUKATO KAWATA & LEOR LANDA, ADVISING PRIVATE FUNDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO REPRESENTING HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AND THEIR ADVISERS § 2:2 (2010).
23. Davidoff, supra note 19, at 193; Timothy Inklebarger, Hedge Funds Pick Up the Pace in
Fixed-Income Trading, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS
(Aug.
13,
2010),
available at
http://www.pionline.com/article/20100813/REG/100819933; JORDAN, KAWATA & LANDA, supra note
22, at § 2:2.
24. See, e.g., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS, supra note 19, at § 4:1; JORDAN,

KAWATA & LANDA, supra note 22, at
21.

§ 13:1; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 2, at ix-x, 7, 11-

25. See, e.g., JORDAN, KAWATA & LANDA, supra note 22, at § 27:2; JOSEPH W. BARTLETT,
EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS § 24
(2010); HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS, supra note 19, at §§ 4:18, 5:5.
26. Pursuant to Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 12g-1
promulgated thereunder, issuers with total assets of more than $10 million and a class of equity
securities held by 500 or more persons are required to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange

Commission and be subject to reporting requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2010); 17 C.F.R. §
240.12g-1 (2010).
27. See, e.g., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS, supra note 19, at§§ 4:12, 4:19, 4:21,
4:22, 4:27, 4:51; JORDAN, KAWATA & LANDA, supra note 22, at §§ 2:3, 3:2, 3:11, 13:1, 13:3, 13:5,
13:6, 14:6.
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to Section 205(b)(4) of the Investment Advisers Act and Rule 205-3(a)
promulgated thereunder. 28
Prior to the enactment of the Private Fund Registration Act, advisers
to private equity and hedge funds relied upon the exemption in Section
203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act to avoid the registration,
reporting, recordkeeping, and examination requirements in the Investment
Advisers Act.29 Under Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act,
investment advisers with fewer than fifteen clients were exempt from the
registration, reporting, recordkeeping, and examination requirements in the
Investment Advisers Act. 3
Private equity and hedge fund advisers
historically interpreted Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act to
only require the fund being advised to count as a client within with the
meaning of the statute (as opposed to counting each investor in the fund,
which calculation methodology would have eliminated the ability of most
private equity and hedge fund advisers to rely upon the exemption in
Section 203(b)(3)). 3 1
IV. PRIVATE FUND REGISTRATION ACT OF 2010
The Private Fund Registration Act eliminates the exemption in Section
203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act historically relied upon by
private equity and hedge fund advisers, 3 2 and permits the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission to require such advisers to "maintain such
records of, and file with the Commission such reports regarding, private
funds advised by the investment adviser, as necessary and appropriate in
the public interest and for the protection of investors, or for the assessment
of systemic risk by the Financial Stability Oversight Council."
In
28. See, e.g., flEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS, supra note 19, at § 3:24, 4:40; JORDAN,
KAWATA & LANDA, supra note 22, at §3:30.
29. See, e.g., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS, supra note 19, at § 3:2; JORDAN,

KAWATA & LANDA, supra note 22, at § 6:18.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
31. See, e.g., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS, supra note 19, at

§

3:5; JORDAN,

KAWATA & LANDA, supra note 22, at § 6:18. Although the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
in 2004 tried to prevent private equity and hedge funds advisers from interpreting Section 203(b)(3) in
this manner through the adoption of Rule 203(b)(3)-2 promulgated under the Investment Advisers Act,
17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2006
overturned Rule 203(b)(3)-2 as being contrary to the purpose of Section 203(b)(3). Goldstein v. S.E.C.,
451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
32. Private Fund Registration Act, supra note 4, at § 403.
33. Id. at § 404. The Financial Stability Oversight Council was established by the financial reform
bill to, among other things, "identify risks to the financial stability of the United States." Id. at tit. I §
112(a). Under the Private Fund Registration Act, the Commission is required tU make available to the
Financial Stability Oversight Council "copies of all reports, documents, records and information filed
with or provided to the Commission' by private equity and hedge fund advisers "'as the Council may
consider necessary for the purpose of assessing the systemic risk posed by a private fund." Id. at §404.
The reports, documents, records, and information provided by private equity and hedge fund advisers to
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particular, the Private Fund Registration Act requires advisers to private
equity and hedge funds to maintain records of:
(A) the amount of assets under management and use of leverage;
(B) counterparty credit risk exposure;
(C) trading and investment positions;
(D) valuation policies and practices of the fund;
(E) types of assets held;
(F) side arrangements or side letters, whereby certain investors in a
fund obtain more favorable rights or entitlements than other
investors;
(G) trading practices; and
(H) such other information as the Commission, in consultation with
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, determines is necessary
and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of
investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.34
The Private Fund Registration Act also requires the Commission to
"issue rules requiring each investment adviser to a private fund to file
reports containing such information as the Commission deems necessary
and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or
Finally, the Private Fund
for the assessment of systemic risk."3
Registration Act requires the Commission to conduct periodic inspections
of the records maintained by private equity and hedge fund advisers
pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act, and permits the Commission to
conduct "such additional, special, and other examinations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors, or for the assessment of
systemic risk."3
V. ANALYSIS
The registration, reporting, recordkeeping, and examination
requirements imposed upon private equity and hedge fund advisers under
the Private Fund Registration Act "for the protection of investors" (as
opposed to "for the assessment of systemic risk") are inconsistent with the
exemptions for wealthy investors in the federal securities laws. 37 The
the Commission (and by the Commission to the Financial Stability Oversight Council) are generally
afforded confidential treatment and exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
Private Fund Registration Act, supra note 4, at § 404.
34. Id. at § 404.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Cf Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory
Philosophy, Style and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L REV. 975, 991 (2006) (noting that when the Commission

8
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rationale underlying the exemptions for wealthy investors in the federal
securities laws is that wealthy investors can "fend for themselves" because
they either possess sufficient financial sophistication to make informed
investment decisions or can acquire the services of advisers who possess
such sophistication.
As noted by Commissioner Troy Paredes, "[t]his
animating principle reflects an implicit cost-benefit analysis that the costs
of SEC intervention in such instances exceeds the benefits" to wealthy
investors of such intervention. 39
The Private Fund Registration Act regulations impose substantial
compliance costs upon private equity and hedge fund advisers and
substantial regulatory costs upon the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the
Commission is expected to expend approximately $140 million from 2010
through 2014 to implement the Private Fund Registration Act, and private
equity and hedge fund advisers are expected to expend up to $139 million
per year to comply with the Private Fund Registration Act. 4 0
The beneficiaries of these costs, to the extent that they are borne "for
the protection of investors" (as opposed to "for the assessment of systemic
risk"), are the wealthy investors in private equity and hedge funds, whose
due diligence and monitoring efforts with respect these funds are
subsidized by the public through the Commission's enforcement of the
Private Fund Registration Act. This public subsidy of wealthy investors is
inapposite to the exemptions for wealthy investors in the Securities Act
(where "accredited investors" and "qualified institutional buyers" are not
given the benefit of a prospectus from issuers relying upon Rule 144 or
Rule 144A promulgated thereunder) and the Investment Company Act
(where "qualified purchasers" and certain "accredited investors" are not
given the benefits of the registration, reporting, organizational,
recordkeeping, and examination requirements therein from issuers relying
upon Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(7) thereunder). 4'
Furthermore, the Private Fund Registration Act regulations for the
protection of wealthy investors in private equity and hedge funds are
contrary to the normative principle that such investors can "fend for
themselves" and therefore do not require the benefit of the federal
securities laws, as reflected in the abovementioned provisions in the
Securities Act and the Investment Company Act as well as the Investment
attempted to regulate hedge funds in 2004 through the adoption of Rule 203(b)(3)-2, see supra note 31,
"the SEC has decided to regulate an industry dominated by presumptively sophisticated investors" who
"are considered able to 'fend for themselves").
38. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
39. Paredes, supra note 37, at 991 n.65.
40. ('ONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT ADVISERS
REGISTRATION ACT OF 2009 (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/
docl10727/hr381I8.pdf
41. See supra Part 11.
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Advisers Act (where "qualified clients" and "qualified purchasers" are
deemed sufficiently sophisticated to enter into investment advisory
contracts that provide for compensation to the investment adviser based
upon the capital gains or appreciation of client funds). 42
The inconsistency of the Private Fund Registration Act regulations
"for the protection of investors" with the exemptions for wealthy investors
in the federal securities laws does not relate to the provisions of the Private
Fund Registration Act designed "for the assessment of systemic risk." The
utility of the analysis by the Commission of private equity and hedge fund
assets under management, trading and investment positions, counterparty
credit risk exposure, types of assets held, and other related information "for
the assessment of systemic risk" is irrelevant to the inconsistency of the
Private Fund Registration Act regulations "for the protection of investors"
with the exemptions for wealthy investors in the federal securities laws. In
addition, the fact that the Commission will be analyzing information
provided by private equity and hedge fund advisers "for the assessment of
systemic risk" does not militate in favor of the Commission analyzing
additional information "for the protection of investors" when such
additional regulation is costly, subsidizes wealthy investors who are
deemed to be able to "fend for themselves," and is inconsistent with
exemptions for wealthy investors elsewhere in the federal securities laws.
The collapse of large hedge funds such as Long-Term Capital
Management in 1998 (which necessitated a $3.65-billion private bailout
facilitated by the Federal Reserve because the hedge fund had positions in
the market in excess of $100 billion and an equity base of only $1 million)
and Bear Steams Company, Inc., hedge funds in 2007 (which required Bear
Steams to incur $1 billion in write-downs prior to its own collapse in
March 2008) also do not support the proposition that private equity and
hedge fund advisers should be subject to inconsistent investor protection
regulation under the federal securities laws, since the central issue in these
collapses was whether they would cause disruption in international markets
(i.e., systemic risk and not whether investors were defrauded).43

42. See supra Part II.
43. See, e.g., Barbara C. George, Lynn V. Dymally & Maria K. Boss, The Opaque and UnderRegulated Hedge Fund Industry: Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L &
Bus. 359, 369, 399 (2009) (citing CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 52-53

(2008)); Lydie N.C. Pierre-Louis, Hedge Fund Fraudand the Public Good, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 21, 76-77 (2009). Although Barclays Bank PLC, a shareholder in the umbrella fund that
managed the Bear Steams hedge funds, sued Bear Steams for fraud alleging that Bear Steams
concealed one of the funds' declining value, Barclays eventually dropped the lawsuit with prejudice.
George, Dymally & Boss, supra, at 402. Furthermore, two managers of the Bear Steams hedge funds
were acquitted of criminal fraud charges, although a civil lawsuit by the Commission is still pending.
Zachery Kowe & Dan Slater, Two Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11 /business/l11bear.html; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Cioffi,
No. 08-CV-2457, 2008 WL 4693320 (ED.NY. Oct. 23, 2008).
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Furthermore, the multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme orchestrated by
Bernard Madoff through his hedge funds also does not support the
proposition that private equity and hedge fund advisers should be subject to
inconsistent investor protection regulation under the federal securities laws,
since the Commission conducted three examinations of Madoff's
operations in 1992, 2004, and 2005 and was notified of credible and
specific allegations regarding the fraud on six occasions between June 1992
and December 2008 yet failed to uncover the fraud. 4 Finally, the Private
Fund Registration Act's regulations "for the assessment of systemic risk"
(such as disclosure of trading and investment positions, types of assets
held, and trading practices) provides the Commission with sufficient
information to determine whether hedge funds such as those operated by
Madoff are Ponzi schemes, and the risk of Ponzi schemes in hedge funds is
the same as in private issuers relying upon the exemptions for wealthy
investors in the Securities Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
As described in Part V, the registration, reporting, recordkeeping, and
examination requirements imposed upon private equity and hedge fund
advisers under the Private Fund Registration Act "for the protection of
investors" are inconsistent with the exemptions for wealthy investors in the
federal securities laws. 4 5 In order to eliminate this inconsistent treatment of
wealthy investors under the federal securities laws, Congress should
remove the investor protection requirements imposed upon private equity
and hedge fund advisers under the Private Fund Registration Act. On the
other hand, if it determines (as many have argued) that wealthy investors
cannot "fend for themselves," 46 Congress should eliminate the exemptions
for wealthy investors in the federal securities laws. However, it should be
noted that the elimination of the exemptions in the federal securities laws
for wealthy investors would require many new issuers to register with the
44. OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE

SEC

TO

UNCOVER

BERNARD

MADOFF'S

PONZI

SCHEME

(Aug.

31,

2009),

available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf; see also Jacob Preiserowicz, The New Regulatory
Regime for Hedge Funds: Has the SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, I1 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
807, 835-40 (2006) (questioning whether registration of hedge fund advisers under the Investment
Advisers Act would deter fraud in hedge funds).
45. Although not discussed in this comment, the author would like to note the inconsistent
exemption of venture capital funds from regulation under the Private Fund Registration Act as well as
the inconsistent definitions of wealthy investors under the federal securities laws (i.e., the different
definitions for "accredited investors," "qualified purchasers," and "qualified clients").
46. See, e.g., John E. Girouard, The Sophisticated Investor Farce, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:30
http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/accredited-investor-sec-personal-finance financial-advisorPM),
network-net-worth.html; Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC's
'AccreditedInvestor' Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 733, 748 (2009); Howard M.
Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited and Undiversified, 47 OKLA. L..REV. 291, 301 (1994).
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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act and be subject to the
reporting requirements under the Exchange Act and the reporting,
organizational, recordkeeping, and examination requirements and
investment restrictions under the Investment Company Act. Consequently,
the Commission would require a substantial increase in its budget to
effectively enforce these regulations for the benefit of wealthy investors.
Amending the federal securities laws as set forth above will help
ensure that the securities market is subject to uniform, principled regulation
as opposed to regulation that is inconsistent and appears politically
expedient.
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